Finitely Additive Priors, Coherence, and The Marginalization Paradox by Sudderth, William
f 
Finitely Additive Priors, Coherence, and 
The Marginalization Paradox 
by 
William D. Sudderth 
Technical Report No. 358 
*Research supported by NSF Grant MCS77-28424. 
.. 
ABSTRACT 
The marginalization paradox, which arises in a Bayesian theory 
of inference based on improper, countably additive prior distri-
butions, cannot occur when proper, finitely additive priors are used 
instead. Nor· is there a paradox_if Bayesian theory is based directly 
on a notion of coherence • 
1. Introduction 
The use of finitely additive probability distributions is, in 
some respects, similar to the use of improper, countably additive 
ones. Both types of distributions depart from the widely accepted 
Kolmogorov axioms and both types make possible within a Bayesian 
framework a number of standard statistical inferences which are 
impossible for a Bayesian restricted to the Kolmogorov framework. 
As a simple example, consider a normal variable X with var-
iance 1 and unknown mean 8. After observing X = x, a Bayesian 
with an improper, uniform prior for 8 on the whole real line, has 
as posterior for 8 a normal distribution with mean x and variance 
1. A Bayesian whose prior for 8 is a finitely additive, trans-
lation invariant measure on the line has the same posterior (Ex-
ample 4.1 of [2]), but no proper, countably additive prior could 
result in it. 
In addition to the similarities, there are also crucial differ-
ences between the finitely additive and improper theories. Points 
in favor of improper priors are the relative ease of computation and 
the essential uniqueness of the corresponding posteriors. On the 
other hand, improper priors can result in incoherent inferences 
whereas proper, finitely additive priors cannot do so (cf.Corollary 1 
and Example 5.2 of [2]). Similarly, improper priors can lead to 
margi~alization paradoxes (cf.[l] and [4]), but, as is the main con-
tent of this paper, no such paradox can arise in the finitely additive 
setting. 
After a formulation of the paradox is presented in section 2, 
two demonstrations of its impossibility in the finitely additive 
1 
theory are presented in sections 3 and 4, respectively. The argument 
of section 3 is indirect and relies on the connection between finitely 
additive priors and coherence established in [2]. This argument will 
actually show the marginalization phenomenon to be impossible in a 
theory based on coherence even if the definition of 1=coherence" is 
not precisely that used in [2]. The argument given in section 4 is 
a direct calculation which shows the paradox cannot arise in any 
theory based on proper distributions whether the distributions are 
required to be countably additive or only finitely additive. 
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2 • The marginalization oar ad ox · 
Let 0 and X be nonempty sets to be regarded as the parameter 
space and observation space, respectively. Let p be a conditional 
probability distribution on X given 0; that is, p associates with 
each 8 & 0 a probability distribution Pa on a fixed cr - field of 
subsets of X. (Henceforth, to avoid verbosity, cr - fields will not 
be mentioned nor will assumptions of measurability be made explicit. 
However, all sets which occur are hereby assumed to be equipped with 
suitable cr - fields and all functions to be appropriately measurable.) 
The scenario of the paradox revolves around two Bayesians B1 and 
B2• The first Bayesian, B1 , has a prior distribution n on 0 
and is able to calculate his posterior q. (A posterior q is a 
conditional probability distribution on 0 given X, and qx reflects 
B1 's posterior opinion after the observation x. In the improper 
theory, the density for q is calculated formally from Bayes formula, 
but, in the proper theory, q is calculated using the theory of 
conditional distributions where Bayes formula is not always avail-
able. A complete definition is in [2] or section 4 below.) It is 
assumed that B1 is interested only in the parameter T = cp(8) 
which takes values in the set T • Thus, after an observation 
Bl calculates 
• ,# 
which is the - distribution ... of T. x, qx .. qx 
It is further assumed that ~ depends only on a statistic qx 
y = r(x) which takes values in the set Y. That is, .,. .,. qx = q~ 
whenever r(x) = r(x1) Finally, it is assumed that 
.,. 
the P9, p -e 
distribution of Y, depends only on ·-r = 4> ( 0) • To sum up , by 
a process of marginalization, B1 is able to describe his inference 
about T by a conditional probability distribution q on T 
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given Y where 
(2 .1) 
whenever y = r(x), and there is also a natural conditional dis-
tribution p on Y given T defined by 
(2.2) ~ P-r = Pe 
whenever T = ~(0). 
Enter B2• The second Bayesian is informed about B1 's infer-
ence represented by q and is able to calculate p from the given 
p. It seems plausible that q should represent a Bayesian inference 
relative to the reduced parameter space T and the reduced observation 
-
space Y. Thus B2 should be able to find a prior n on T for 
which q is the posterior. If no such n exists, then the situation 
is called a marginalization paradox. 
Here is an example due to Stone and Dawid [4], 
Example 1: Suppose e = (µ,a2) and Pe is the distribution of 
a random sample x = (x1 ,···,xn) from a N(µ,cr
2). Assume that the 
parameter of interest is T = µ/cr. If B1 has the improper prior 
dµdcr/cr, then, as shown in [4], his marginal posterior density for 
T given· x is proportional to 
(2. 3) (-n T2 ) m n-2 ( -{} ) exp 2 J0 W exp\2 ~ + yTW dw, 
1 
where y = (Ex.)/ (Ex~)2. 
l. l. 
It is also shown in [4] that the density 
for y given e depends only on .T and is proportional to 
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(2. 4) 
Since (2.4), considered as a function of 0, does not divide 
(2.3), there is no improper, prior density that B2 can choose for 
-r which will enable him to reach the same posterior for -r as B1 • 
Stone [3] points out that it follows from results of Heath and 
Sudderth [2] that B1 could choose a proper, finitely additive 
prior for 0 which would lead to the same posterior. However, as 
the next two sections show, B2 can find a proper, finitely additive 
prior which leads to the same posterior for -r. In fact, by 
the Propostiion of section 4, if B1 has the finitely additive 
prior 1T for 8, B2 · can take his prior for 1' to be the 1T -
distribution of 1'. 
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3. Coherence 
Consider a bookie B1 who, conditional on the observation x, 
posts odds on subsets of 0 in accordance with the probability 
distribution q • Imagine also a gambler who, conditional on x, 
X 
on the subset A of 0 thereby 
X 
winning b(x) if A contains the true parameter value and losing 
X 
s(x) otherwise. If the function b is bounded, the pair 
S = (A,b) is called a simple betting system and its expected pay-
off to the gambler as a function of 0 is 
where A (0) 
X 
is 1 or O according to whether 0 is in A or 
X 
The bookie B1 or his odds system q is said to be coherent if 
there does not exist a finite number s . . . s l' 'n ~f simple betting 
systems such that the sum E1(e) +···+ En(e) of the corresponding 
payoff functions is uniformly positive as a function of 0. This 
definition of coherence is the one used in [·2] where it is shown 
that B1 is coherent if and only if q is the posterior for some 
finitely additive prior ~ on 0. 
Suppose now that B1 is a coherent bookie so that q is the 
posterior of the finitely additive prior n. Assume also that B1 
decides to post odds only on those subsets of 0 which depend only 
on 't = $(9), which is equivalent to his posting odds on subsets of 
T in accordance with suppose further that, as in section 2, 
,,. 
qx depends only on y = r(x) so that B1 is effectively posting 
odds according to the q 
y 
of (2.1) conditional on y. Finally 
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assume that Pe depends only on T so that can be defined as 
in (2.2). 
If a second bookie B2 now decides to post odds on subsets of 
T according to q, he will be coherent also. Intuitively, this 
is clear because B2 is p·osting the same odds as B1 • To be more 
precise, let S,... = (A .... , b 1 be a simple betting system to be used 
against B2 • So A,,. y is a subset of T for each y and b ~ 
is a bounded function from Y 
S = (A,b) by setting 
to the reals. Define the system 
A~.= {8: ~re) EA' } 
'fl·· r(x) 
and 
b(x) = b~(r(x)) 
for every x. It is straightforward to verify that the corres-
ponding expected payoffs satis~y 
E(0) = E'(<j>(0)). 
Thus, any finite collection S .... ••• S' with a uniformly positive l' 'n 
expected total payoff would result in a collection S ••• S with l' ' n 
the same property. But B1 is coherent by assumption and no such 
collection exits. Thus B2 is coherent and, by the result of [2] 
mentioned above, q is the posterior for some finitely additive 
prior 1T. 
Except for the connection to finite additivity, the argument just 
presented applies when the definition of coherence is modified in 
various ways. For example, suppose B1 is said to be coherent if 
7 
there do not exist S • • • S with E (0) + • · • + E (0) 1' ' n 1 n everywhere 
nonnegative and somewhere positive. Then B2 is coherent in the 
same sense. 
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4. Finitely additive priors 
The object in this section is to demonstrate that, under the 
assumptions of section 2 and the additional assumption that B1 's 
prior n on 0 is proper, then B2 can use as prior on T the 
1T - distribution of T = $(0) and thereby arrive at the posterior 
q which corresponds to the distribution of T under B1 's pos-
terior q. For the demonstration precise definitions of the terms 
"marginal" and "posterior" are needed. 
Let n be a proper, (possibly only) finitely additive probability 
measure on 0, and let p be a conditional probability distribution 
on X given 0. The marginal m of (n,p} is the probability 
measure defined on subsets A of X by 
(4.1) m(A) = fp(Al8) dn(0), 
where p(Al0) = p8(A). A conditional probability distribution q on 
0 given X is a posterior for (n,p) if 
(4.2) ffh(8,x)dqx(8)dm(x) = ffh(8,x}dp 8(x)d~(0) 
for bounded, real-valued functions h defined on 0 x X. Thus q 
is a posterior if the pair (m,q) determines the same distribution 
on the product space 0 x X as does (n,p). 
-Assume now the setting of section 2 and let n be the n -
distribution of 
which satisfies 
1T(B) 
-t. That is, rr is the probability measure on T 
- -1 
= n($ (B)), 
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for subsets B of T or, equivalently, 
Jg(T) dTI(T) = fg($(8)) dn(8) 
for bounded, real-valued g defined on T. 
Proposition: q is a posterior for (n,p). 
Proof: First calculate the marginal m of (n,p) on Y as follows: 
for A c Y, 
m(A) = fp(AI T) dn(-r) 
= JP(Al<i>(8)) dn(8) 
= Jp"'(A.18) dn(8) 
= fp(r -l(A) I 8) dn(8) 
-1 
= m(r (A)). 
-so m is the m - distribution of y = r(x) and satisfies 
(4 .3) Jg(y) dm(y) = fg(r(x)) dm(x) 
bounded, real-valued g defined on Y. 
Now let h be a bounded, real-valued function defined on T x Y 
and calculate again. 
Jfh(T,y) dq (T) dm(T) = ffh(T,r(x)) dq (T) dm(x) y r(x) 
= JJh(T,r(x)) dq"' (T) dm(x) 
X 
= Jfh($(0), r(x)) dq (0) dm(x) 
X 
= ffh($(8),r(x)) dp 0 (x) dn(8) 
= Jfh($(0), y) dp0 (y) dn(S) 
= Jfh($(0), y) .dp$(S) (y) dn(8) 
= ffh(T,y) dp (y) dTI(T). 
T 
The first equality is by (4.3) and the fourth is by (4.2). The others 
are immediate consequences of the definitions. 
The proof of the proposition is now complete. 
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